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It is a core principle of liberal societies that individuals may not be 
deprived of their liberty unless the reasons for doing so respect their 
status as autonomous persons.  This principle puts stringent limits on the 
use of preventive detention.1  I argue here that one use of preventive
detention that is consistent with those limits is the long-term preventive 
detention (LTPD) of people who have been convicted either of a very
serious crime or of a string of serious crimes.2  These people can
justifiably be subjected to LTPD because a justifiable part of their 
punishment is loss, for some period of time, of the normal immunity to 
LTPD.  If this period of time extends beyond whatever period of time 
they have lost their liberty as a matter of punitive detention, then they
may be subject to LTPD for the remainder of that period.
What makes stripping certain criminals of their immunity to LTPD for 
a period of time morally acceptable is that such a punishment fits their
crimes.  If they show sufficient disrespect for the law, then they no 
longer deserve to receive one of the benefits that normally flow from
being an autonomous and accountable person.  In particular, they no
longer deserve to have the status of a person who must be presumed to
be law-abiding.  A state must normally accord its autonomous and
accountable citizens3 this presumption as a matter of basic respect for 
1. These limits are not absolute.  I do not deny the theoretical possibility that
some actors could be so dangerous that they need to be preventively detained even 
though they have not been convicted of a crime.  But I have argued elsewhere that this
possibility is very unlikely to arise in practice, unless the conditions for suspending 
habeas corpus apply, in which case these people can be detained in accordance with the
model articulated below.  See Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to
Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 930–33 (2011); see 
also infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.  Importantly, I would expect such cases, 
if ever there were any—again, outside of conditions like those in which habeas can be 
suspended—to be much rarer than the cases of people who pose a “vivid danger” to 
others, who some have argued can be detained in excess of what a proportionate punishment
would allow. See Anthony E. Bottoms & Roger Brownsword, Dangerousness and Rights, in
DANGEROUSNESS: PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION 9, 17–21 (John W. Hinton
ed., 1983). 
2. This Article develops an idea I first put forward in Walen, supra note 1, at 
905–13. 
3. The restriction to citizens reflects the thought that although the state has a duty
to police its own dangerous citizens, it does not owe that duty to dangerous aliens. 
Aliens, even if legally resident, may be deportable on grounds that fall short of criminal 
acts, such as visa violations. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).  Moreover, if
they are deportable but no state is willing to take them, then they may justifiably be 
subjected to LTPD if there is sufficient evidence that they are sufficiently dangerous. 
See id. at 696 (allowing LTPD for “terrorism or other special circumstances where 
special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened 
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security”).  Indeed, the Zadvydas Court may go too far in implying that only extremely
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their autonomous moral agency.  Rather than treat them as potentially 
dangerous animals,4 the state must treat them as free agents who can be 
trusted enough to do what is right to have the liberty to move freely in 
the society,5 and who can and should be held accountable if they choose 
instead to commit criminal acts.  If, however, particular actors demonstrate
by their criminal acts that they do not deserve the presumption that they 
will be law-abiding, then they have, at least for a while, lost the moral
basis for claiming the right to benefit from the respect that grounds the 
immunity to LTPD.  They remain autonomous moral actors who can be 
held accountable for their future criminal choices, but they lose their 
status as persons who must be given the freedoms that come with the 
presumption that they will obey the law.  For brevity, I will refer to this 
lost status account of the lost immunity to LTPD as the “lost status 
view.” 
To be clear, the presumption that a person will be law-abiding is not 
absolute.  One obvious manifestation of the limits of the presumption of 
law-abidingness is the fact that the state has an obligation to police its
residents, arresting and prosecuting them if it finds sufficient evidence of
criminal activity.  The modern state also has good reason to engage in
more intrusive activities, such as screening passengers at airports and
dangerous aliens—those who pose a national security threat—may be subject to LTPD. 
This is not to deny that resident aliens have due process rights that are the same as
citizens. See Lucia Zedner, Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of
Crime Control, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 379, 392–93 (2010) (citing DAVID COLE, ENEMY
ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 7 (2003)).  But due process rights should not be confused with a substantive 
right to be allowed to stay in and move freely about the country.  Their liberty should be
as great as possible, consistent with the security of others, but they do not benefit from 
the same basic rights as citizens to be released and policed rather than subjected to 
LTPD.  See Walen, supra note 1, at 922–24. 
4. See Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 268 
(1999) (discussing how we could “simply treat each other like bacteria, as potentially
beneficial or harmful objects, and act accordingly”).
5. Some would extend this principle of trust to hold that it is inappropriate to
criminalize action as long as there is some opportunity for an actor to turn away from the
criminal path.  They would not allow criminal liability for attempts until an actor “has 
actually unleashed [the] risk of harm [to others].”  See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY 
KESSLER FERZAN WITH STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 198–99 (2009).  I think that takes this principle too far. See generally
Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How To Understand the Law 
Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term 
Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2011) (stating that the 
choice to form and act on criminal intentions can be treated as criminal in its own right).
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prohibiting them from taking objects on airplanes that would normally 
be harmless but that could be used to disguise bombmaking material.6  It
may create inchoate and preparatory crimes that allow the state to arrest
and punish people for criminal activities that are more or less remote
from acts that would actually cause an unjustifiable harm.7  I believe that 
it may even hold people in short-term preventive detention (STPD) to
protect others from harm.8  But there are limits to the preventive activities a
state may undertake, among them being that the state has to leave its 
citizens the basic freedom to pursue life plans that are not overly harmful
to others.9  Long-term detention is qualitatively unlike the other restrictions
on liberty just canvassed; it more radically undermines or limits one’s
ability to pursue one’s own reasonable life plans.  Accordingly, what the
presumption of law-abidingness requires is that a state not deprive its
autonomous and accountable citizens of the fundamental freedom from 
detention or imprisonment for a long period of time without a criminal 
conviction.10 
In practice, then, the presumption of law-abidingness implies that even 
if there is good reason to predict that certain citizen-actors will choose to
break the law, and even if the best course of action, from a utilitarian
point of view, would be to subject them to LTPD, the state may not do 
so unless they have lost their status as people who must be presumed to 
be law-abiding.  The point of this Article is not to argue for that principle
but to argue that the presumption that an actor will be law-abiding, like 
the right to liberty itself, can be forfeited by criminal actions.  In other 
words, the point is to argue that a just punishment could involve loss of 
the status of being a beneficiary of this presumption just as much as it
could involve the loss of liberty.
There are two practical reasons for embracing the lost status view as 
part of a punishment regime.  First, it allows a state to address the risk 
posed by certain dangerous criminals who might otherwise be released
6. The merits and risks of these and other forms of “preemption” are discussed by
Daniel Rosenthal, Assessing Digital Preemption (and the Future of Law Enforcement?), 
14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1735479. 
7. See generally Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive 
Rationales and the Limits of the Criminal Law, in  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 279 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (discussing how these sorts 
of laws can go too far). 
8. See Walen, supra note 1, at 913–16. 
9. This idea of freedom to pursue one’s own life plans traces back at least to John 
Rawls’s idea that a just society provides a fair structure in which people can rationally
pursue their own conceptions of the good, while reasonably seeking and supporting fair 
terms of cooperation with others.  See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48–52 
(1993). 
10. See infra Part II.
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into society where it would be hard to prevent them from committing 
further violent acts.11  Second, it does a better job of addressing that
problem than the current criminal regime in which predictions of
dangerousness are factored into criminal sentences,12 confusing the 
deprivation of liberty that people deserve as a matter of punishment with
the lost immunity from LTPD that they deserve, which may or may not 
call for lost liberty.  It is also better than a number of alternatives that I
discuss below. 
Before concluding this introduction, one more clarification is called 
for.  The idea that one could lose the benefit of the presumption that one 
is law-abiding may seem to imply not only that one could lose one’s
immunity to LTPD but also that one could lose the presumption of 
innocence at trial for a new crime.  But that would not be a sound
inference.  The presumption at issue is the presumption that an actor will
obey the law, not the presumption that an actor has obeyed the law.  It 
might be objected that if conviction for a sufficiently serious crime 
justifies loss of the one presumption, it should justify loss of the other. 
In response, I must admit that as a purely formal matter, the two could 
be lost together.  Nevertheless, there is reason to retain the presumption 
that an actor has obeyed the law even when his actions could justifiably
cause him to forfeit the presumption that he will obey the law.
Punishment is fitting only if the state can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that an actor has broken the law.13  If one were to lose the
presumption that one has obeyed the law in virtue of having broken the 
law in the past, then one would be subject to additional punishments 
even if the state cannot carry the normal burden of proof concerning 
one’s supposed additional crimes.  At least outside of the context of 
11. See Walen, supra note 5, at 821–24 (discussing the limited effectiveness of
measures that stop short of detention as a means of establishing security). 
12. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 & n.6 (2001) (asserting that
“the justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past crimes to preventing future 
violations through the incarceration and control of dangerous offenders” and listing 
various criminal laws that place significant emphasis on the prevention of future crimes). 
13. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (reasoning the reasonable doubt 
standard “provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law’” (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895))). 
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enforcing discipline in prisons or revoking parole,14 allowing new 
punishments for new crimes that have not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt would make a convict who has served prison time 
vulnerable to undeserved and hence unjust punishments. In
contrast, the preventive detention that may be warranted if the convict
has lost immunity to LTPD is not an extra punishment.  The punishment 
is the loss of the immunity to LTPD, not the actual loss of liberty.  This 
distinction may seem dubious if one focuses only on the loss of liberty
itself.  But if one accepts that a defining characteristic of punishment— 
an essential feature that distinguishes it from other losses that may be 
inflicted on a person—is that it expresses or communicates censure for 
wrongs done,15 then one can say that the actual loss of liberty in LTPD is 
not punishment because it does not have that expressive value.  A person 
who has lost immunity to LTPD should be subjected to LTPD only if
there is good reason to believe that detaining him is the best way to 
satisfy the interests of all parties involved.  These forward-looking 
considerations should not be tainted or distorted with punitive motives.
The punishment, again, is fully captured in the lost immunity to LTPD. 
I proceed as follows: In Part II, I introduce a basic framework for
detention consistent with respect for autonomy and locate the lost status 
view within that framework.16  In Part III, I spell out the lost status view 
in more detail and contrast it with other similar practices or positions,
including the indefinite sentencing scheme defended by Christopher 
Slobogin in this issue.17  In Part IV, I illustrate it by applying it to some 
14. The need to discipline prisoners who commit new offenses in prisons has to 
allow for a more flexible response than a full-blown new trial for every new offense.  See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). But there are limits to the punishments
prisoners can receive without a new trial.  It has been argued, I believe persuasively, that 
punishments that extend prisoners’ time in prison on the basis of new violations must be 
based on new criminal trials with all the due process rights normally afforded criminal 
defendants.  See Erin Kae Cardinal, Comment, Bray v. Russell: The Constitutionality of
the “Bad Time” Statute, 35 AKRON L. REV. 283, 284–85 (2002) (discussing the
due process violations inherent in allowing a parole board to extend a prisoner’s sentence 
for violations committed in prison and established by clear and convincing evidence);
Stephanie D. Weaver, Note, Will Bad Times Get Worse? The Problems with Ohio’s Bad 
Time Statute, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 341, 353 (2000) (discussing the same). 
Revocation of parole is a different matter.  See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
15. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, at xv (2001)
(discussing the connection between the aim of expressing censure and punishment); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING
THE PRINCIPLES 17–21 (2005).  Importantly, not all aspects of punishment have to be 
directly expressive of censure.  See infra Part V. 
16. I introduced this framework and defended it in the context of a discussion of
the preventive detention of suspected terrorists in Walen, supra note 1.
 17. Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The 
Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1127 (2011). 
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familiar cases in which the lost status view would make a difference.
And in Part V, I defend the justice of the proposal by defending its
retributive bona fides, arguing in particular that retributivism can be 
mixed with a concern for preventing future harms, and discussing how a 
notion of proportionality could limit this dimension of punishment. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO AUTONOMY-RESPECTING DETENTION
As the Supreme Court wrote in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, “‘In our society 
liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited 
exception.’”18 Unfortunately, the Court has not been particularly good at
articulating a coherent principle governing the space of “carefully
limited exception[s].”  As a result, some have argued that the range of
exceptions shows that “American law eschews [preventive detention]
except where legislatures and courts deem it necessary to prevent grave
public harms.”19  In other words, some think that our law has only a
presumption against preventive detention, one that can be overcome 
whenever the consequences for security clearly call for doing so. 
However descriptively accurate this sort of utilitarian account of the law 
may be, it is nonetheless morally indefensible.  It gives short shrift to the
right to liberty of autonomous actors. 
The question is, What would a principled account of the right to 
liberty of autonomous actors look like, and under what conditions would 
it allow preventive detention?  One simple suggestion is that only the 
mentally incompetent can justifiably be subjected to preventive detention.20 
18. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). 
19. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory
and Practice, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 88 (2011), http://www.harvardnsj.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Vol.-2_Klein-Wittes_Final-Published-Version.pdf; see also
BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 34 (2008); BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN
A. PEPPARD, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, DESIGNING DETENTION: A MODEL
LAW FOR TERRORIST INCAPACITATION (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes/0626_detention_wittes.pdf. 
20. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments 
on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator
Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 96 (1996) (“In the absence of mental illness 
sufficiently serious to preclude criminal responsibility, predictive confinement violates 
the first principle of limited government—to treat every mentally competent adult as a 
free and autonomous person responsible for his chosen actions—and only for his chosen 
actions.”); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 771, 785 (1998) (“[T]hose able to . . . choose [to comply with the law] 
should have their liberty and their autonomy respected by being treated as rational
 1235













     
  






   
       


















Although I agree that mental incompetence is one morally sound 
condition that could justify LTPD—for those who are also a danger
to themselves or others21—the problem is that it is merely one of the 
conditions in which people can sometimes justifiably be preventively
detained.  Other conditions include: 
• Being a defendant awaiting trial,22 
• Being a material witness for a trial,23 
• Being a juror subject to sequestration at a trial,24 
• Being a deportable alien,25 
• Being a prisoner of war (POW),26 
• Being a suspected terrorist (ST),27 
beings—and thus prosecuted pursuant to the criminal law should they choose to
do wrong.”). 
21. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (noting the state’s “power
to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill”).
22. See Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. III 2010); see also
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (holding that the Bail Reform Act does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment).  The maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the Speedy Trial 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2006 & Supp. III 2010).  Under the Speedy Trial Act, the 
trial of a detained person who is being held in detention solely because that person is 
awaiting trial must, unless certain exceptions apply, commence not later than ninety days
following the beginning of such continuous detention. Id. § 3164(b).  There are, however, 
many exceptions or conditions allowing detention for longer than ninety days.  Id.   
§ 3161(h).  These include: 
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his
own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of
the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the 
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (allowing the detention of material witnesses “in
accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title”). 
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1121 (West 2004); see also United States v. 
Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 917 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that sequestration may be used to 
protect “the jury from trial publicity, extraneous influences and harassment”). 
25. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (upholding the Immigration 
and Nationality Act and holding that it allows detention of deportable aliens at least for
six months if there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future”). 
26. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (stating that “[p]risoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities,” which 
implies that they may be detained until that time); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 519–20 (2004) (allowing the military detention of a U.S. citizen with reference to
Article 118). 
27. This is one of the most controversial entries on the list.  Courts have held that
the President is authorized by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to 
hold suspected terrorists associated with al Qaeda in LTPD. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).  See, for example, the opinions 
1236
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• Having a contagious and possibly deadly disease,28 
• Having the intention to commit serious crimes against others,29 
• Having the intention to inflict serious harm upon oneself,30 and 
• Being a dangerous recidivist.31 
authored by judges Traxler, Williams, and Wilkinson in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d
213, 253, 284, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 
S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).  I have argued, however, that that authority should be limited 
to use on those aliens who come from countries that cannot be relied on to police them 
and for whom no other country can be found that would reliably police them.  See 
generally Walen, supra note 1.
28. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997) (“A State could hardly be
seen as furthering a ‘punitive’ purpose by involuntarily confining persons afflicted with 
an untreatable, highly contagious disease.”); see also Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902) (“[S]tate quarantine laws 
and state laws for the purpose of preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of 
contagious or infectious diseases, are not repugnant to the Constitution . . . .”).
29. See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: 
Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=183 
9844; see also Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The 
Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 790 n.60 (1996) 
(“I cannot imagine a more basic right of the community than to use the instrument of the 
law to restrain those who currently intend—in the strong sense of ‘intend’ which imports
the beginning of an effort to harm—to commit a crime.”); Matthew C. Waxman, 
Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L 
SEC. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2009) (discussing the use of administrative detention to disrupt 
terrorist plots or schemes). 
30. Arguably, the intention to commit suicide is insufficient grounds for detention,
except when combined with a mental illness.  “Every state statute authorizing confinement for
a suicidal individual requires also that the individual evidence indicia of mental illness.”
Kate E. Bloch, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment— 
A Bystander Duty To Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929, 934 n.36 (1987) (citing 
statutes).  However, indicia of an intent to commit suicide is almost certainly prima facie 
evidence of mental illness.  As Bloch notes, “The medical profession is slowly coming to
recognize the existence of a small fraction of rational suicides.” Id. at 938 n.63
(emphasis added).  By implication, the vast majority of instances in which a person 
intends to commit suicide are irrational and, at least in that regard, are grounded in a
mental illness.  In addition, given that third parties are unlikely to be able to immediately 
distinguish rational intentions to commit suicide from intentions based on mental illness, 
a short period of detention for the purpose of psychiatric evaluation is presumably legally
justifiable. See id. at 952 n.153 (citing Norman L. Cantor, A Patient’s Decision To Decline
Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 228, 256 (1973)). 
31. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15–16 (2003) (upholding California’s 
three-strikes law, which requires that a defendant convicted of a felony receive “an 
indeterminate term of life imprisonment” if that defendant had two or more prior serious 
or violent felony convictions (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999)));
see also Robinson, supra note 12, at 1430 nn.2–3, 1431 & n.4. 
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I am not suggesting that anyone who fits into any of these categories can
be subject to LTPD.  I am suggesting that people who fit into these 
categories can justifiably be subject to some amount of preventive 
detention for reasons having to do with what it means to fit into those
categories.
What kind of coherent principle would (1) justify the use of preventive 
detention for people who fall into this wide range of categories and 
(2) respect the liberty rights of autonomous individuals?  The answer, 
which I have argued for elsewhere, is what I call the Autonomy-Respecting 
Model of Detention.32  It articulates six ways in which detention can be
reconciled with respect for autonomy.  These are based on the following
distinctions.  First, those who can be detained fall into two basic
categories—those subject to punitive detention, and those subject to 
preventive detention.  The former can justifiably be detained because
they brought their time in prison upon themselves by their autonomous
choice to commit a crime.  The latter can be subdivided into those who
may be subject to STPD and those who may be subject to LTPD. 
Those subject to STPD may justifiably be detained for the sake of the 
general welfare because the burden on them is not too great, and we may
ask reasonably small sacrifices of people for the sake of the general
welfare.33  Those who fit in this category include defendants detained 
pretrial, material witnesses, jurors subject to sequestration, STs and other
suspected serious criminals detained for the purposes of investigation,34 
those who seem to have the intention to commit criminal acts or to 
inflict serious harm on themselves,35 and most deportable aliens.36 
32. See Walen, supra note 1, at 879. 
33. The line between short-term and long-term detention is necessarily vague but 
not completely arbitrary.  I argued elsewhere for a dividing line of six months.  See id. at
915–16. 
34. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (holding that “indefinite 
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized” by the AUMF, implying that 
STPD for interrogation is authorized by the AUMF); see also John Radsan, A Better Model
for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1227, 1246 (2006) (proposing
a three-month interrogation warrant for STs); Waxman, supra note 29, at 35 (mentioning
that “short-term detentions [of STs] might satisfy most information-collection requirements”). 
35. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting here why the 
intention to harm others cannot be the basis of a long-term detention policy.  Once 
persons have been detained on the basis of having illicit intentions of some sort, they can 
then deny that they have, or even had, those intentions.  If the state puts the burden of 
proving that they no longer have an illicit intention on the detainee, the state may indeed 
be able to detain them for a long time, despite their denials.  But then the state will have
effectively stripped them of their immunity to LTPD on the basis of something far less 
than a criminal conviction, and that would violate their rights as autonomous persons.  If,
however, the state retains the burden of showing that detainees continue to harbor illicit
intentions, it will have great trouble doing so, as any even half-witted detainee who 
wishes not to be detained will cease saying or doing anything that indicates still harboring 
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The toughest category to justify is the remaining category of LTPD. 
People may be subject to LTPD only if they fall into one of four 
subcategories:
(1) They lack the normal autonomous capacity to govern their 
own choices—paradigmatically, the mentally ill;37 
(2) They have lost their immunity to LTPD—paradigmatically,
recidivists and those who commit very serious crimes (the
topic of this Article);
(3) They have an independent duty to avoid contact with others 
because such contact would be impermissibly harmful, and 
LTPD simply reinforces this duty—paradigmatically, those 
with contagious and deadly diseases but also those who cannot 
control certain violent impulses towards others;38 and 
(4) They are incapable of being adequately policed and held 
accountable for their choices—paradigmatically, anyone
threatening security during a time of rebellion or invasion 
when the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended,39 POWs,
and some STs.40 
illicit intention. This limits the utility of Ferzan’s suggestion as a means of neutralizing
the threat posed by dangerous individuals, such as terrorists.  See Ferzan, supra note 29. 
36. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires that aliens be detained during a 
ninety-day removal period after receiving a final removal order, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) 
(2006), but they may be detained longer than that, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006).
However, as the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis made clear, if the postremoval detention
lasts longer than six months, the government must show that it will terminate in
the “reasonably foreseeable future.”  533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). 
37. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (noting the state’s “power
to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill”).
38. See supra note 28; see also Walen, supra note 1, at 916–22.  One might also 
argue that this category could also be used to justify LTPD of those who cannot avoid
acting on violent self-destructive impulses.  On the one hand, that makes sense because
self-destructive impulses are different from self-destructive choices that the actor
reflectively endorses.  An irresistible impulse is not susceptible to rational reflection.  On
the other hand, if the actor would rather live a life free from detention, running the risk
that the actor will succumb to an irresistible self-destructive impulse, it is hard to justify
taking a paternalistic attitude towards that choice.  I would support the second hand and 
believe the law does too. See supra note 30 for a discussion of the need for STPD to
ensure that an intention to kill oneself is rational or, in other words, one that the actor
would reflectively endorse. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
40. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text; see also Walen, supra note 1,
at 922–27. 
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The first and third of these categories are straightforwardly consistent 
with respect for autonomy.  Those who lack the normal capacity for 
autonomously making choices are not autonomous individuals, and thus 
they are not disrespected if they are not treated as autonomous 
individuals.  And those who have a duty to avoid contact with others 
because they cannot help but endanger them if they have contact with 
them cannot complain that their autonomy is being disrespected if they
are involuntarily subjected to LTPD for as long as their condition lasts. 
They should voluntarily subject themselves to such detention, and if they 
do not, subjecting them to such detention involuntarily would merely
enforce on them a duty they already have. 
The problematic categories are the second and fourth categories. The
fourth I explore at length elsewhere.41  I argue that those who cannot be
adequately policed if released—those who are a threat to security during 
a period of rebellion or invasion, when the normal policing powers are 
not functioning or are overwhelmed, as well as most POWs and those 
STs who would be released to countries where the police cannot provide 
adequate security—are extrinsically unaccountable.  That is to say that
because of circumstances external to them, they cannot be held
accountable in anything like the way that we think people should be held
accountable.  And I argue that being extrinsically unaccountable is 
analogous to being intrinsically unaccountable—as the mentally ill are.
Either way, one is unaccountable. 
What I will focus on here is the second category: the one that covers 
serious recidivists and those who commit very serious crimes.  I will 
further defend and articulate the view that one element of a justified
punishment can be the temporary loss of the normal immunity to LTPD. 
I will argue that it is rational and morally justifiable to add loss of this 
immunity to the standard deprivation of liberty as a possible mode of 
punishment.  And I will argue that this immunity may be lost for a period of
time proportional to a combination of the severity of the crime and the 
pattern of recidivism.  One who has lost immunity to LTPD may, then,
be subjected to LTPD if the security interests of society outweigh his 
interest in liberty. 
It is important to be clear how the lost status view differs from an
older move in the criminal justice literature.  A number of people have 
been critical of the admixture of preventive detention into a criminal
justice system that claims it is depriving people of their liberty as 
punishment for past crimes.42  These critics typically call for distinguishing 
the part of the criminal justice system that is essentially preventive and 
41. See Walen, supra note 1, at 922–27. 
42. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 12, at 1429–32; Steiker, supra note 20, at 806–07. 
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setting up a parallel scheme for justifying preventive detention, rather 
than smuggling it into criminal punishment.  I respect their call for 
clarity regarding which portion of a sentence can be justified as a loss of 
liberty based on past criminal acts and which portion cannot.  But I 
reject the idea that preventive detention can be justified independently,
except insofar as it is justified using the framework just described.  The
thesis I am arguing for here is that in many of the cases that concern
these critics, the only possible justification for preventive detention is
that the person has committed a crime, the just punishment for which 
includes loss of immunity to LTPD. 
A final word of qualification is called for.  What I am discussing here 
is long-term detention.  Other limitations on liberty, limitations more 
serious than screening passengers at airports and other generally applied 
limitations but less serious than long-term detention—limiting travel,
limiting persons with whom one can have contact, requiring one to 
submit to random searches, and even requiring one to report to another 
on a regular basis—are arguably morally justifiable without a criminal 
conviction as a prerequisite.43  They are arguably justifiable, on the
model of certain civil protection orders, upon a showing of dangerousness
based on a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing 
evidence.44  These lesser infringements may be justifiable in the way that
43. British control orders, established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005,
c. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/pdfs/ukpga_20050 
002_en.pdf, have all of these features and something approximating parttime house
arrest.  See Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control
Orders, 60 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 174, 179–80 (2007). 
44. See, e.g., Bryant v. Walker, 78 P.3d 148, 151 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that 
the standard for a stalking protection order in Oregon is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence of five things, including “that the contacts, cumulatively, caused [the petitioner] 
reasonably to fear for her personal safety”); see also Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes 
Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 14 n.32 (2006) (“The required standard of proof [for obtaining 
civil protection orders] in many jurisdictions is a preponderance of the evidence, but the 
majority of statutes are silent on the standard of proof.”).  Meanwhile, the standard for 
depriving the mentally ill of their liberty is clear and convincing evidence that they are a 
danger to others or themselves.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979). 
The bases for restrictions that fall short of the LTPD approved of in Addington, but that 
apply to the mentally competent and that are greater than those imposed by a protective 
order, arguably should be established by clear and convincing evidence as well.
Astonishingly, British control orders do not require even a preponderance of the 
evidence.  They may be issued if the Secretary of State has “‘reasonable grounds for
suspecting’ that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity.” 
Zedner, supra note 43, at 176 (quoting section 2(1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act). 
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STPD is: as something that even innocent people may have to endure for 
the sake of the common good.45  This is not to deny that these lesser 
intrusions can be serious; nor is it to deny that adequate procedures must
be developed to ensure that these limitations are imposed on people only
when there is good reason to believe that doing so is necessary for the 
protection of the common good.  It is simply to say that lesser intrusions 
into liberty may be justifiable even when LTPD is not.46 
III. DESCRIBING THE LOST STATUS VIEW AND CONTRASTING
IT WITH RELATED POSITIONS
According to the lost status view, one aspect of a punishment, on a 
retributive theory of punishment, can be the temporary or even the
permanent loss of the normal immunity from LTPD.  I call this a “lost
status” view because the immunity, as explained in the introduction, is 
grounded on a kind of status that liberal societies must normally recognize
in their autonomous and accountable citizens: that of benefitting from 
the presumption that they will abide by the law.  Autonomous and 
accountable actors may nonetheless deserve to lose their immunity from 
LTPD if they have committed and been convicted of criminal acts that 
show that they do not deserve to benefit from the presumption that they 
will be law-abiding citizens.  Actors may, as punishment for those 
criminal acts, deserve to be treated for some period of time as though 
they merely have an interest in being free, rather than the normal right to 
be free.  Their interests can then be weighed against the interests of
others who are put at risk by their freedom.  If the balance of utilities 
45. Of course, a certain percentage of those punished for crimes are also innocent. 
The difference is that when establishing criminal guilt, we use what is ostensibly the
highest standard of proof that could be used consistently with making positive findings: 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  When the state uses a lesser standard of proof, it is 
essentially saying that more than the minimal number of false positives can be accepted 
in order to promote a particular good. 
46. It is important to note that if these lesser infringements go on long enough, 
they become more oppressive than detention for periods that would count as long term. 
For example, when faced with the choice between a three-year intensive supervision
probation program and one year in prison, about one-third of a group of nonviolent 
offenders in Oregon chose the prison sentence.  Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United 
States, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE 149, 187–88 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) (citing Joan
Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Perceptions of Punishment: Inmates and Staff 
Rank the Severity of Prison Versus Intermediate Sanctions, 74 PRISON J. 306 (1994)). 
Similarly, “[w]hen Minnesota inmates and corrections staff were asked to equate a 
variety of criminal sentences, they rated three years of intensive supervision probation as 
equivalent in punitiveness to one year in prison.” Id. at 188.  In that case, a
precondition for imposing these lesser infringements for a long time may be a criminal
conviction for a sufficiently serious crime.
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would call for them to be detained, then they can justifiably be detained
for as long as they have lost their immunity from LTPD. 
A proportionate loss of immunity from LTPD might overlap completely
with the prison sentence of a convict.  In that case, it would make no 
practical difference.  But as I will explore in more detail in the next Part, 
there are cases in which it makes sense for the loss of immunity to LTPD
to be somewhat longer than whatever loss of liberty the person may
suffer as a matter of punishment.  Consider the following schematic
example: Jones might, as a punitive matter, lose his liberty for ten years 
but lose his immunity from LTPD for an additional ten years.  In such 
cases, his loss of status would make a practical difference during those 
second ten years. 
Again, whether it would be appropriate to detain him in the second of
these ten-year periods would depend on the balance of his liberty interest
and the security interests of others.  Because his punishment in this latter
period would consist in his susceptibility to LTPD, not the detention 
itself, he should be detained only if the security needs of others call for
that drastic a measure.  If a less restrictive loss of liberty would produce 
a sufficient gain in security to warrant imposing it, and the extra gain in
security from detention would not outweigh the extra loss of liberty to 
the detainee, then he should not be detained. 
At this stage, the most helpful way to clarify what the lost status view
holds may be to contrast it with some similar positions and practices.
I consider here four: the practice of parole; R.A. Duff’s proposal for 
excommunication of persistent, dangerous offenders;47 limiting 
retributivism;48 and indeterminate sentencing.49 
Starting with parole, there is a resemblance between it and the lost 
status view, but there are also three important differences.  First, if we
assume that a given prison sentence is deserved as a matter of
punishment, then what granting parole does is punish the prisoner less
than he deserves.50  Lost status, in contrast, allows detention beyond the
47. See DUFF, supra note 15, at 169–74. 
48. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1962) (regarding the purposes of the Model Penal Code (MPC)). 
49. I focus here on the proposal defended by Slobogin, supra note 17. 
50. The purpose of parole is to “help individuals reintegrate into society as
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term 
of the sentence imposed.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).  This practice 
is in obvious tension with the idea that certain crimes, committed with certain levels of 
culpability, deserve certain sentences.  It can be justified on retributive grounds only if 
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period that could be justified as punitive.  People need not be detained 
during the time when they have lost their immunity to LTPD, and their 
release may function very much like parole—it may be likewise based
on a determination that the detainee would not be a danger to others 
in society.51  But such a release is not from a deserved prison sentence.
Second, because the LTPD of one who has lost immunity to it is preventive
detention, not punitive detention, and because the punishment in the lost 
status view is only loss of immunity from LTPD, the conditions of 
detention for one who is subjected to LTPD should be as nonpunitive 
as possible.52  This is not the case for those who are denied parole.
Their conditions are meant to be punitive.53  Third, there should be a 
difference in the presumption with regard to detention.  Parole, at least
some weak or mixed form of retributivism is true, one that allows the state, for a variety
of practical reasons, to allow people to serve less time than they deserve, but not more.  
This sort of mixed retributivism will be discussed in Part V.
51. See, for example, California’s parole statute, which provides that the Board of 
Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines that . . . consideration of the
public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3041(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011).
52. Saul Smilansky has recently argued that if people are detained for the sake of 
others, despite not “deserving” to be detained because of some criminal act, then the 
institutions for their detention would “need to be as delightful as possible.  They would 
need to resemble five-star hotels, where the residents are given every opportunity to
enjoy life.”  Saul Smilansky, Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio, 
30 LAW & PHIL. 353, 355 (2011).  His reason is that the “undesirable nature of the
incarceration (both in itself and as compared to normal life on the outside), when . . .
completely undeserved, cannot but be grave injustice.”  Id. at 356–57.  Smilansky has a 
point if detention is completely undeserved—though even then his image of the five-star 
hotel may be extreme.  But with regard to those cases in which susceptibility to detention 
is a deserved punishment, the force of his argument is somewhat blunted. The
conditions still should not be punitive, but the rest of society should not have to bend 
over backwards to make detainees as comfortable as possible either.
53. What it means to be punitive has recently been called into some dispute.  Adam
Kolber, for example, argues that “retributivists must calibrate each offender’s punishment so
that the punishment imposes the appropriately-sized change in his baseline condition.” 
Adam Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1582
(2009).  David Gray interprets this as implying a subjective baseline, such that those who
do not suffer easily should be punished more so that they suffer as much as others who
suffer more easily, and vice versa.  Gray responds that “punishment is measured and
determined by objective standards,” not subjective suffering.  David Gray, Punishment 
as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1664 (2010).  Kolber, however, insists that his
argument applies equally to objective losses that nonetheless take into account each
person’s baseline in terms of objective standards of welfare.  See Kolber, supra, at 1584. 
My own view follows that of VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 15, at 102.  “With
criminal prohibitions seen as public admonitions, and sanctions as public acts of censure,
what counts [for proportional sentencing] is the degree of blameworthiness of the
offence.”  Id.  In other words, the punishment should track the culpability of the criminal
act, not the welfare of the criminal and how it is affected by the punishment.  An
argument for that position is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
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as classically understood, is discretionary54 and is to be granted when the
parole board judges that a prisoner is sufficiently rehabilitated and will
likely do no further harm outside of prison.55  On this discretionary 
model, there is no presumption that it must be granted if the detainee 
poses no ongoing threat to the community; the detainee still deserves
loss of liberty.56  In contrast, those who suffer LTPD because of their
lost status do not deserve to lose their liberty.  They deserve only their
loss of status, and although that allows the loss of liberty, it allows it 
only if the security interests of the community outweigh the detainee’s
interest in liberty. 
Second, I turn now to Duff’s proposal for the excommunication of 
what he calls a “dangerous offender”: someone who has engaged in the 
“persistent commission of crimes of serious violence against . . .
person[s].”57  Duff starts from the premise that some people do more than
commit individual crimes or even a persistent string of minor crimes; 
they engage “in a continuing attack, a continuing campaign of attacks,
on the community’s members and its central values.”58  These people— 
whose crimes must be serious—commit a persistent crime that is
“categorically more serious” than the sum of its parts.59  They commit  
the more serious crime of attacking the community and its central
values.  For that serious crime, they deserve a more serious punishment,
namely, exclusion from the community in the sense that they may now 
be subjected to “permanent imprisonment.”60  Duff makes it clear that 
the exclusion “should be presumptively permanent, it should not be 
irreversibly permanent; we would owe it to them, as moral agents who 
54. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of
Failing To Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 497–501 (2008) (describing
the historical idea that parole was meant to be given to the rehabilitated prisoner).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Medwed, supra note 54, at 
503–04 (arguing that discretionary parole boards do a better job than mandatory parole 
systems in terms of preserving public safety).
56. Note, however, that parole, once granted, may not be taken away without due 
process, though this due process may fall short of that provided in a criminal trial.  See 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482–84 (1972) (“The parolee has relied on at least 
an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole 
conditions.”).
 57. DUFF, supra note 15, at 170.  It should be pointed out that Duff is not fully
comfortable endorsing his proposal. Id. at 172–74. 
58. Id. at 172. 
59. Id.
60. Id. at 173. 
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could still redeem themselves, to allow them a way back to community.”61 
But he thinks it might be the most just way for a retributivist to deal with
the serious repeat offender.62 
The lost status view differs from Duff’s proposal in two ways.  The 
first difference is that it is not as radical; it does not categorize lost status
as a justification for presumptively permanent imprisonment.  The 
proportional period of lost status may be some determinate term of years 
that should be far shorter than the person’s remaining life span.
Moreover, people who have lost their status have simply lost their 
immunity to LTPD; they have not necessarily lost their liberty.  Whether
individuals should also lose their liberty depends on whether the threat 
they pose can be adequately neutralized using less restrictive means.
The second difference follows from the first.  Because the lost status 
view is not as radical, it does not require the actor to have committed a 
“campaign” of attacks.  It could be attached to certain crimes, even if 
committed only once, as long as the actor has thereby indicated the kind 
of profound disrespect for the law that warrants the penalty. 
Third, the lost status view resembles, but can be distinguished from, 
limiting retributivism.63  Limiting retributivism is the position that holds
that utilitarian goals can and should be pursued within broad limits set
by retributive notions of desert.64  Thus, according to limiting retributivism,
people should serve at least as much time in prison, as a matter of
punishment, as would be minimally required given the gravity of their 
crimes.65  But after that utilitarian considerations might call for the release
of individuals if their interest in liberty outweighs any community
61. Id. at 172. 
62. Importantly, Duff’s argument is retributive.  Although he clearly is motivated
by a concern with what one could say to victims of a persistent criminal who is released
from prison and harms again, his justification is retributive, based on what the actor deserves
for the pattern of persistent, violent crime.  Richard Lippke’s discussion of Duff misreads him
as being fundamentally concerned with an actor’s dispositions, which is a future-oriented, not
a retributive, concern.  See Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders 
and Preventive Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 391–99 (2008). 
63. Christopher Slobogin suggested to me, in a personal communication, that my
position is effectively a version of limiting retributivism.
64. These limits are broad because, as Norval Morris framed it, “we do not have 
adequate ‘moral calipers’ to reach [single correct retributive punishments for each crime, and]
at best, we can merely ascertain when a punishment is clearly excessive or insufficient 
on desert grounds.” Christopher Slobogin, Introduction to the Symposium on the Model 
Penal Code’s Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 671 (2009) (citing Norval 
Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 37 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985)). 
65. Even Morris’s theory of limiting retributivism recognized, even if reluctantly,
the possibility of early release and sentencing mitigation for good behavior or pretrial 
cooperation by a defendant.  See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and 
Practice, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 363, 375 (Michael Tonry ed., 
1997). 
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interest in their being incapacitated by being imprisoned.  And yet no
matter how dangerous, they must be released if they have been in prison 
for the length of time that represents the maximum that could be justified 
on retributive grounds.  In many ways that fits the lost status view. 
There are nonetheless three important differences.  First, the lost status
view is not committed to the skepticism about retributive desert that is at
the core of limiting retributivism. Even if one believes that retributive 
desert is primarily ordinal, with some more or less vaguely defined
anchor points, that might require, in a particular sentencing regime, that 
certain fairly determinate sentences be the norm.66  The lost status view 
can at least accommodate, even if it does not presuppose, that sort of 
determinate retributivism both for the length of deserved imprisonment 
and for the length of deserved loss of the immunity from LTPD.
Second, in many if not most cases the proper punishment for a crime 
either will involve no lost immunity from LTPD or, if there is a period of
lost immunity, will overlap with the period of punitive incarceration. 
Therefore, lost immunity to LTPD will affect only a small percentage of 
criminal sentences.  In contrast, for a limiting retributivist, it would be 
the norm if not the rule that a person’s period of detention should be 
substantially governed by utilitarian considerations.  Third, the utilitarian
considerations that come into play in the lost status view concern only 
the balance between the security benefits of incapacitation and the
liberty interests of the convict.  In contrast, the utilitarian considerations 
that come into play for limiting retributivists run the gamut from the 
benefits of incapacitation to those of general and specific deterrence to
victim and community restoration.67 
Lastly, there is a way in which the lost status view is close to the kind 
of indeterminate sentencing scheme proposed by Christopher Slobogin.68 
Slobogin’s proposal would set the duration of detention—through the 
“risk-proportionality principle”—on the basis of a limited set of 
utilitarian considerations.  Specifically, he would connect it to the product
of the probability that various harms will occur and the magnitude of 
those harms.69  This limits the utilitarian considerations that are relevant
66. This kind of idea is discussed in more detail in Part V below.
67. See Slobogin, supra note 64, at 670.  Note that victim and community restoration
can also be considered part of a retributive sentencing scheme. See infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
68. See Slobogin, supra note 17, at 1128–31. 
69. Id. at 1131. 
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to detention to the same ones that are considered by the lost status
view.70 Nonetheless, Slobogin’s indeterminate sentencing scheme is
different from the lost status view for two reasons.  First, as just mentioned 
with regard to limiting retributivism, the lost status view would only be 
of practical relevance in a small percentage of cases, while Slobogin’s 
proposal aims to govern all cases.  Second, the lost status view would 
incorporate restrictions based on the idea of retributive proportionality.
In contrast, Slobogin eschews the use of any such notion.  Indeed, for
him, a crime is just a “trigger” for entering the world of indeterminate 
sentencing.71  If one takes seriously the idea of retributive proportionality, 
as I do, then his scheme not only is different but would often result in
detentions that are fundamentally unjust.72 
IV. ILLUSTRATION THROUGH APPLICATION
To get an even better handle on the proposal, it will help to apply it to 
a range of cases in which it might well make a difference.  I will 
consider three kinds of cases: (1) cases in which the punitive detention is
short because the crime was merely inchoate or preparatory, but the 
target crime is serious; (2) cases of recidivists; and (3) cases of sexually 
violent predators (SVPs). 
70. The problem with the use of a wider set of criteria is that it allows detainees to 
be used merely as a means of deterring others.  This is a tricky area; I believe that the anchor
points for an ordinal retributive scheme can be set with an eye to general deterrence.
And I believe that people who have committed crimes and caused harms owe it to the
community to endure punishments that will deter others.  But the punishment should at least 
reflect ordinal proportionality. To deviate up from that for the sake of general deterrence 
exacts more from a person than that person can reasonably be thought to owe. 
71. Slobogin, supra note 17, at 1140. 
72. Slobogin resists this conclusion, saying that it follows “only if we allow 
retributivists to hijack the word justice.” Id. at 1160.  He insists that someone who believes in
determinate sentencing takes a position
unjust to the victim of an offender who has been released prematurely, as well
as to the prematurely released offender who must now suffer avoidable 
punishment for a crime the offender would not have committed had detention
and treatment continued.  It is also unjust to the contrite offender who is ready 
to be law-abiding but must serve out the sentence he or she “deserves.”
Id.  I am unsure what it means to be released prematurely.  If it means prematurely
relative to what would be done under Slobogin’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, then
his first argument is equivalent to saying that it is unjust to allow dangerous people to be 
free.  That position, however, is fundamentally at odds with the core premise of this
Article and with liberal society.  As for the contrite offender, a retributivist can take
contrition into account, but insofar as the effect of contrition is limited, it is limited by
the notion of desert, which is at the core of retributive justice itself.  So I see no 
argument here. 
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A.  Preparatory or Inchoate Crimes 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the sentences people get when
they complete a crime and cause a harm are normally both fair and
sufficiently long that there would be no reason to treat them as deserving
to lose their immunity to LTPD afterwards.73  Consider, for example, the 
sentence range the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines suggest for one who has
been convicted of using a firearm in a premeditated aggravated assault
that caused serious bodily injury: sixty-three months to seventy-eight
months.74  I am not committed to the view that such a crime is serious
enough to lose one’s immunity to LTPD, but even if we suppose that it 
is, one can imagine that persons who served that time would also have been
detained for as long as they would have justifiably lost their immunity to 
LTPD. 
Now take the same crime and subtract the injury.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines would, in that case, suggest a sentencing range of thirty-
seven months to forty-six months.75  Just as one can imagine that the
73. This might not be true in some countries, such as Sweden, where the sentences
for even the most significant crimes, such as murder, are, or at least were, relatively 
short.  They may not have seemed short, as the official penalty for murder in Sweden is
ten years to life. BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [CRIMINAL CODE] 3:1 (Swed.).  But a life 
sentence may not actually result in a life in prison.  At one point, lifers in Sweden served
on average eight years in prison.  In recent years, however, this has doubled to sixteen 
years. See John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, 48 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 275, 275 (2008).  Sixteen years is still far shorter than “life,” but it is 
arguably long enough to cover the desire to strip a convict of immunity to LTPD.  If not, 
however, then in countries such as Sweden, adopting a lost immunity to LTPD might
make a difference more often than in countries such as the United States. 
74. I will suppose the act fits the definition of an “aggravated assault” under prong
A: “a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily
injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2A2.2 cmt. § 1 (2010).  The base level for this offense is fourteen. Id.
§ 2A2.2(a).  To that one, I would add the following increases: two levels for an assault
that involved more than minimal planning, § 2A2.2 (b)(1); five levels for the use of a 
firearm that was discharged, id. § 2A2.2(b)(2); and five levels for causing a serious 
bodily injury, id. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B).  That leads to a level of twenty-six.  For a first-time 
offender, that would call for a sentence range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months— 
five years, three months to six years, six months. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
 75. The crime would register five levels lower, for a level of twenty-one.  The 
sentencing range for that level, for a first time offender, is thirty-seven to forty-six
months.  Id. ch. 5, pt. A.  It is worth noting what the sentence would be if the offender’s 
luck went the other way and the offender killed the person who was meant to be merely
injured. That would fit the definition of second-degree murder under federal law.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006).  The base level for that is thirty-eight, for which the suggested
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first sentence would cover the period of time the actor might deserve to
lose immunity to LTPD, so one can imagine that the second sentence 
might not.  It might be thought, for example, that anyone who commits 
aggravated assault and discharges a firearm in the process deserves to
lose immunity to LTPD for six years, in which case the defendant would 
deserve to lose immunity to LTPD for at least an additional twenty-six 
months beyond the end of his punitive sentence. 
Why think that these two punishments—punitive detention and lost
immunity to LTPD—should align this way?  In particular, why think 
that the period of punitive detention should go down if no harm is 
caused?  And why think that the period of lost immunity to LTPD 
should not?  Additionally, why think that the two punishments should be 
of comparable length when a harm is caused?  I will now offer answers 
to the first two questions.  The third question I will just touch on here 
because the answer turns on the question of proportionality for the 
punishment of lost immunity to LTPD, which I will address in Part V. 
First, does it make sense for the period of incarceration to vary
depending on whether a harm is caused, and if so, why? I think the
answer is yes, and the simple reason is that one who has caused harm
has more to atone for than one who has not. Consider again the
aggravated assault case.  If what distinguishes two actors, Jones and
Smith, who perform qualitatively similar acts of assault is only luck— 
Jones happens to hit another with a bullet, Smith happens to miss—then
in one sense they are equally blameworthy.  They both flouted the law in
the same way and acted with the same disregard for the rights of their 
intended victims.  But Jones has something to atone for that Smith does
not.  This makes it appropriate to put more of the burden of carrying the 
social good of punishment—in particular the good of deterring others— 
on Jones.76  By suffering a greater punishment, he does more good for
society.  Of course, in one sense, because Jones does nothing by serving
time in prison, he only suffers the loss of his liberty; he does not actively 
atone for anything.  But in the root sense of atonement—meaning to be 
reconciled with, or at one with, those from whom he has become
sentence is 235 to 293 months, which is, at a minimum, almost twenty years. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.2, ch. 5, pt. A (2010). 
76. I made this point in my reply to ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra
note 5, in Alec Walen, Crime, Culpability and Moral Luck, 29 LAW & PHIL. 373, 381–82
(2010). 
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alienated77—carrying this social burden, even if involuntarily, will help
Jones atone, on a social level, for the harm he has caused.78 
If one focuses on the luck dimension of the case, this differential
punishment may seem to be unjust.79  But the moral landscape is 
permeated by people having to own their luck in this way.80  Two groups
of people can make equally wise or unwise investments, but one will do 
well and one will fail due to dumb luck.  Still, we let ones who did well
keep the lion’s share of their profits.  Two groups can practice
equally healthy or unhealthy lifestyles, and only one group will get sick. 
Still, we let the healthy ones enjoy their health without having to try to
compensate those who got sick until their lives are equally enjoyable or 
miserable.  And so on.  One might wish to undo or compensate for all 
consequences of brute luck.  But not only is it impossible to sort out the 
results of brute luck and choices—life does not operate in simple
pairwise comparisons, and our choices at every moment are framed by
both the choices we have already made and the dumb luck we have 
already encountered—the aim of doing so is deeply inconsistent with 
how we do, and inevitably must, aim to run our lives: by deciding how
to play the odds given the situation we find ourselves in.  To attempt to 
sort out the brute luck is to fail to come to terms with what it means to
have one’s own life to lead.  This is not to say that we should, as a 
society, abandon those who suffer bad luck to their fate.  We still owe 
help to those who suffer.  Nor is it to say that we should be indifferent to
the landscape of options people face.  The demands of justice call for 
structuring the institutions of society to come as close as possible to
giving people fair opportunities to succeed with their life plans, insofar 
77. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 73 (10th ed. 1999) (giving the 
etymology of atone as coming from Middle English, “to become reconciled, fr. at on in 
harmony, fr. at + on one”).
78. This is not to deny that a criminal who causes harm might also owe reparations 
directly to the victim.  See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 15, at 94–96. 
79. The luck dimension primarily serves to distinguish completed but failed attempts
from successfully completed crimes.  Even then, skill and level of commitment, more
than luck, may sometimes explain the difference. Luck is even less likely to be the dominant 
explanatory factor distinguishing attempts that are interrupted before the final act and
those that are taken to completion.  And the gap between preparatory crimes, such as
providing material support to terrorists, and completed crimes that cause harms, such as 
setting off a bomb that kills many civilians, is not a matter of luck at all.  It is a matter of
type of engagement.  Nevertheless, the luck objection applies to enough of these cases to 
be worth taking seriously. 
80. I discuss most of the themes in this paragraph in Walen, supra note 76, at 379–81. 
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as those plans are respectful of the rights of others.81  It is simply to say
that we should be sanguine about the thought that those who cause 
harms, in part because of dumb luck, have more to atone for than those
who act in qualitatively similar ways and do not cause harms.82 
Now the question is, If we accept that the punishment for a crime that
does not cause a harm should be less than that for the same crime that
does cause a harm, why should we not treat loss of immunity to LTPD 
the same way?  The answer, in brief, is that although punitive detention 
and lost immunity to LTPD are both forms of hard treatment, the notion
of proportionality that guides how each should be deployed is shaped by 
a somewhat different set of utilitarian purposes.  The former serves the 
purpose of general deterrence, and the latter does not; this explains why 
the need to atone for harms caused is relevant only to the former. 
This explanation must be unpacked in stages.  I start by looking at the 
justifications for hard treatment.  The retributive justification for hard
treatment is that it expresses society’s condemnation of the criminal
act.83  It would not be sufficient, however, merely to say that society 
condemns criminal acts.  To be taken seriously, society has to punish for
criminal acts.  Moreover, to achieve certain utilitarian goals—classically
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation in one sense of the
word84—in a way that respects the dignity of autonomous moral actors, 
those goals have to be pursued in combination with punishment for 
criminal acts, thereby giving potential criminals prudential reason both 
to pay attention to the authoritative condemnation of such acts and to 
avoid performing such acts in the first place.85 
81. This is the essence of Rawls’s notion of justice as fairness.  See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14–15 (1971). 
82. This fits the general pattern in criminal law, in which the punishment for attempted 
crimes is lower than that for completed crimes. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW § 27.02[C], at 381 (5th ed. 2009).  The MPC resists this, saying that an
attempt is generally to be treated as a crime of the same grade as the most serious offense 
attempted.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1962).  But it makes an exception for capital 
crimes and “felon[ies] of the first degree.”  Id. The exception seems to be an ungrounded
concession to the dominant legal rule.  But I suggest that the truly ungrounded position is
the MPC’s main position, which ignores the moral relevance of having caused a harm.
83. For an early statement of this view, see JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING
97–100 (1970). 
84. As Michael Moore has pointed out, rehabilitation can be a paternalistic idea, 
aimed at remaking individuals for their own good, or it can be a utilitarian idea, aimed at 
remaking individuals so that they are less dangerous to others. See  MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME 85 (1997). 
85. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 15, at 21–24, 32 (defending this 
double role of hard treatment as helping both to express censure and to achieve the 
utilitarian goals of the criminal law).
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Deprivation of liberty, for some period of time, is the primary means 
by which most societies dole out hard treatment.86  But as I will explore 
in greater length in Part V, the quantity of hard treatment cannot be set 
only with reference to the actor’s culpability or blameworthiness for the 
crime itself.  The sentencing regime that is used must also be framed, at
least in part, with reference to the utilitarian purposes it serves.87 
Moreover, as just explained, the need to atone on a social level for having
caused a harm connects, in particular, to the social good of general
deterrence.  And that is why when criminals have caused no harm, it is
appropriate to impose a shorter sentence on them.  They should still 
suffer some hard treatment, proportional to their culpability, where the 
notion of proportionality is specified, at least in part, with reference to
the utilitarian goals served by that system of punishment.  But a criminal’s
sentence can justifiably be shorter than it would be if the criminal had
also caused a harm.
Lost immunity to LTPD is also a retributive punishment in the sense 
that it expresses condemnation of people for their disrespect of the law 
and of those who were the targets of their criminal activities.  And it too 
should be proportional to the crime committed.  But the similarities with
punitive detention do not end there; they also include the fact that
what proportionality means in the context of lost immunity cannot be
pinned down without reference to some utilitarian considerations.
However, lost immunity does not engage as cleanly with the goal of 
providing general deterrence.  It would, indeed, be an odd fit for general
deterrence because one cannot say in advance how undesirable the loss of 
immunity will be.  In each case it will depend in substantial part on
86. Duff envisions a number of other forms of hard treatment that he would prefer 
to use, at least in cases of nonviolent crimes: a reparative burden, community service, and
participation in confrontational programs.  DUFF, supra note 15, at 108–09.  I see these,
however, as complementary ideas, not ones that should displace the loss of liberty as the 
norm for hard treatment. 
87. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently downgraded rehabilitation as a 
primary goal of punitive detention, unanimously holding that the Sentencing Reform Act 
precludes federal courts from “impos[ing] or lengthen[ing] a prison sentence to enable an
offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.”  Tapia 
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011); see also VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, 
supra note 15, at 102 (“The offender may not, for example, be held in a given penal 
regime for a significantly longer period than others convicted of similarly blameworthy
offences, even were the extra time helpful in inducing ‘reform’ on his part.”).  Both leave 
open the possibility, however, that if it would help promote reform if sentences were 
generally longer or shorter, then that would be a relevant consideration in designing a 
system of punishments. 
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whether the lost immunity is accompanied by lost liberty.  The latter, 
however, is not part of the punishment; it is merely a contingent
possibility given the punishment.  Thus, lost immunity to LTPD is not a 
good vehicle for carrying the burden of atoning for harms caused.  Its 
length should, instead, be more or less completely determined by the 
actor’s level of culpability—in particular, the extent to which the actor’s 
crime shows a profound disrespect for the law and the rights of those 
targeted by the criminal action. Therefore, although the period of
punitive detention should be shorter if no harm is caused, the period of
lost immunity should be the same regardless of whether harm is caused. 
We can extend the range of examples for which the causing of harms 
is relevant to punitive detention but not lost immunity to LTPD from 
attempts to preparatory crimes, which, like attempts, are normally
punished less severely than the related completed crime.  For example,
someone who has given material support to a terrorist organization can
be sentenced to at most fifteen years in prison.88  This is in contrast to 
someone who commits a terrorist act that actually kills someone, who 
can be sentenced to either life in prison or death.89  At the same time, it 
would arguably be reasonable to think that at least some people who give 
material support to terrorist groups have shown such fundamental 
disrespect for the law and for the rights of others that they deserve to 
lose their immunity to LTPD for more than fifteen years.90  Again, this 
does not mean that they should necessarily lose their liberty for more 
than fifteen years.  But if they still seem to pose a great threat to others, 
then they could be subject to LTPD for some longer period of time. 
Admittedly, I have still not given any reason to think that the duration 
of lost immunity should track more closely the punishment for a crime
that caused a harm, rather than one that did not.  For now, however, I
will simply claim that there is no prima facie reason to think that the 
period of lost immunity has to track, at most, the length of punishment 
for crimes that do not cause harms.  If it could be longer, then that opens 
up the possibility that this dimension of punishment would not be of any 
practical significance when the actor commits a serious crime and causes
a serious harm but would be disclosed as relevant in analogous or related
cases in which no harm is caused.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). 
89. Id. § 2332(a)(1).
90. It is equally clear that some who provide what is called material support for
terrorism deserve no penalty whatsoever.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 
2705, 2732 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (objecting to the use of the material support statute
to criminalize such things as teaching members of designated foreign terrorist organizations
how to “petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief” 
(quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009))).
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B.  Lost Immunity for Recidivists
The period of punitive detention for a given crime may seem adequate 
to cover the fitting loss of status when the crime is a first offense, but it
may seem inadequate if the crime is one in a series of offenses,
especially if they are of a similar and serious nature.  But this mismatch
bears a complicated relationship to the normal sentencing practices with
regard to recidivists.  It is not unusual for punitive detention sentences to 
go up for repeat offenders.  Returning to the assault example used above, 
if the defendant who shot another and caused serious bodily injury had 
been convicted of two other crimes, each with sentences exceeding 
thirteen months that ended less than fifteen years ago, then the defendant’s 
sentence range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would be seventy-
eight to ninety-seven months.91  In other words, the lower end would
match the higher end for someone with no criminal history, and the 
upper end would be more than a year and a half longer.  This is what is 
known as a recidivist premium.  So the question is, How should recidivist
premiums work with regard to both punitive detention and loss of 
immunity to LTPD? 
It must first be noted that recidivist premiums in the context of 
punitive detention have been the source of some controversy.  Some 
think that having a prior record “provides no good reason to judge either 
the current offense or the offender more harshly.”92  Others are willing to
throw away the key for anyone with “three strikes,” at least insofar as
they are moderately serious strikes.  I take a middle position, akin to that
proposed by Stephen Morse, who discussed the theoretical merits of
extending the crime of reckless endangerment to cover the crime of
failing to “commit oneself voluntarily or to take other reasonably effective
steps to avoid causing future harm” when one knows, on the basis of
91. This is based on the defendant’s having a criminal history category score of six 
points or Category III.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.1(a), 5A
(2010).  That in turn assumes that there is nothing else about the defendant’s prior
convictions that makes them more serious.  If they were “prior felony convictions of 
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” then the defendant’s
criminal history category would be Category VI.  See id. § 4B1.1(a)–(b).  That would
increase the sentence to a minimum of ten years and a maximum of twelve-and-a-
half years. See id. § 5A. 
 92. DUFF, supra note 15, at 167.  Duff, following von Hirsch, is willing to consider 
some small first-offender discount for crimes that are not particularly serious.  But otherwise 
he resists recidivist premiums, except, perhaps, for his idea of excommunicating
persistently dangerous offenders.  See id. at 170–74; Lippke, supra note 62, at 391–99. 
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one’s past crimes, that one is tempted to commit them.93  In other words, 
those convicted of crimes have an obligation to reform themselves, and 
their subsequent crimes are more culpable because they carry the weight
of having failed to do so.  Multiple offenses, particularly in the recent
past, indicate that one has chosen not to reform oneself, and that can be 
the basis for an increased punishment.
What I want to add to Morse’s proposal is the idea that the form this 
punishment should take is lost immunity to LTPD.  For what recidivists 
have really shown is that they are undeserving, for some extended period 
of time, of the normal presumption that they will be law-abiding.  They
do not show that their crimes are worse than earlier crimes of the same
sort.  With the possible exception of a small mitigation for first-time 
offenders committing relatively minor crimes,94  there is no reason to 
take the culpability of any given crime, such as stealing a certain amount 
of money, to vary, depending on whether it is a first criminal act or a 
tenth one; nor do the number of prior convictions and warnings not to
commit future crimes show that a subsequent crime is a more heinous 
act than crimes for which the defendant was first convicted.95  An assault 
is an assault, a theft is a theft, and the flouting of a judge’s instructions 
to reform oneself does not make the assault itself into a worse crime.
What another crime, after some number of convictions and sentences,
does show is that one has not taken on the task of reforming oneself and
that one therefore deserves to lose one’s status as a presumptively law-
abiding person.  Even if one’s crimes are not so serious that they warrant
loss of immunity to LTPD on their own, a recidivist pattern could justify 
a punishment of such lost immunity.
I should highlight that this is offered as a reformist proposal. 
Currently recidivist premiums are expressed in terms of longer prison 
93. Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 113, 152 (1996). Morse characterizes his proposal as “purely heuristic” or, 
in other words, one he would not recommend adopting “because it would be wildly
intrusive and a nightmare to administer.”  Id. at 152 n.126.  He nevertheless thinks it 
illuminates a sense in which we should be responsible for ourselves.  It is worth noting, 
in this context, that recent research into how humans deal with temptation suggests that it 
is not best resisted by will power but by avoiding the temptation. See Roy F. Baumeister 
et al., The Strength Model of Self-Control, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 351, 
351 (2007) (discussing the way that will power resembles “a muscle that gets tired”);
Jonah Lehrer, Don’t! The Secret of Self-Control, NEW YORKER, May 18, 2009, at 29 
(discussing how children who exercise self-control distract themselves from the tempting 
object). 
94. See DUFF, supra note 15, at 167–69. 
95. See id. at 168 (arguing that disrespect for the law is not what matters when the 
crime is malum in se and is already fully taken into account by the nature of the crime if 
it is malum prohibitum). 
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sentences.96 These are clearly meant to be incapacitative.  In other 
words, they are tools for LTPD.  But if the most recent crime does not 
itself warrant the long prison sentence, then the long sentences are
disproportionate and unjust.  What would make more sense is lost 
immunity to LTPD, in which LTPD would be used only if necessary to 
preserve the welfare of the wider community; otherwise lesser limits on
the defendant’s liberty would be called for. 
To see this critique in the context of a concrete example, consider the 
case of Ewing v. California.97  Ewing had committed a substantial string 
of prior offenses: two violent crimes (a battery and a robbery), five theft
offenses, four burglaries, and two possession offenses (a gun offense and
drug offense).98  Prior to his most recent conviction, he was sentenced to
nine years for one of those robberies and three of the burglaries.  Ten 
months later, while still on parole, he stole three golf clubs, worth about 
$1200, from a pro shop.99  For that last crime he was sentenced to
twenty-five years to life, with no possibility of parole.100 
No reasonable person thinks that Ewing could deserve to lose his 
liberty for twenty-five years to life for stealing three golf clubs.  The
Supreme Court let the punishment stand, but that was because the 
constitutional jurisprudence of proportionality in the United States, as 
linked to the idea of cruel and unusual punishments, is exceedingly 
deferential to legislatures outside of the context of the death penalty.101 
At the same time, it is hard to see how someone like Ewing would 
deserve to be treated as though he is still a presumptively law-abiding 
citizen.  He has shown that he is not.  The question is, What punishment 
is fitting for him?
The penalty of twenty-five or more years in prison, without the 
possibility of parole, is needlessly harsh.  Indeed, even lost immunity to 
LTPD for twenty-five years seems too harsh, but given his long criminal 
background, it is not absolutely indefensible.  What is indefensible—or 
96. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2011). 
97. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
98. Id. at 17–18. 
99. Id. at 18–19. 
100. Id. at 20. 
101. The problems developing a jurisprudence for the death penalty have been 
great.  They eventually caused Justice Blackmun to throw up his hands, declaring: “From 
this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”  Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Arguably the problems in the death
penalty context have given the Court pause in other contexts. 
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would be indefensible if California had been administering the punishment 
of long-term lost immunity to LTPD as a third-strike punishment—is the 
failure to consider what would be the least restrictive alternative, given 
the security needs of the community.  Because Ewing committed mostly
property crimes—though some were violent (robbery with a knife) and
some risked violence (burglary)—a more fitting punishment would have 
been, after serving his prison sentence for theft, a period of lost
immunity to LTPD accompanied by measures such as some sort of 
intrusive monitoring of his activities—perhaps with a tracking device on
his person102—and perhaps a ban on carrying anything like a knife in
public.  Violation of these conditions could be conceived of either as 
new criminal acts that could send him back to prison or as evidence that 
he is too dangerous to be given that much freedom, at least for some
period of his ongoing loss of immunity to LTPD.  But as long as he
avoided future crimes or violations of these restrictions, there would 
seem to be no reason for him to lose his liberty again. 
C.  Lost Immunity for Sexually Violent Predators 
I turn now to the last of the three examples: the LTPD often imposed 
on SVPs after they have served their time in prison.  As a matter of
constitutional law, SVPs can be subjected to LTPD after serving their 
punitive sentences as long as they suffer “a mental abnormality” that 
results in their having a “special and serious lack of ability to control 
behavior.”103 Many have argued that it makes no sense to say that
offenders can be responsible enough for their actions to deserve
punishment and yet so unable to control their impulses that they can be 
subject to LTPD after having served their sentences.104  Yet there is a
way in which this practice is morally defensible.  SVPs seem too sane 
not to be subject to criminal trials, and at the same time, insofar as they 
do suffer from a mental abnormality that makes it especially hard for 
102. Tracking devices are already used postconviction in some jurisdictions in other 
contexts, such as for sex-crime parolees.  See Karl Vick, Laws To Track Sex Offenders
Encouraging Homelessness, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2008, at A3 (discussing one feature 
of California’s Jessica’s Law). 
103. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997)). 
104. See, e.g., Aman Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators:
The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 489, 503–04
(2006) (citing Stephen J. Morse, Fear and Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 257–58 (1998)); Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful 
Combatants, and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 107 (2005); Morse, supra
note 4, at 272. 
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them to control their behavior,105 there is extra reason to want to subject 
them to LTPD. 
To illustrate the problem, consider the case of Leroy Hendricks, the 
plaintiff in the first SVP case to reach the Supreme Court.  Hendricks
claimed that he did not simply have difficulty controlling his impulses:
“He explained that when he ‘get[s] stressed out,’ he ‘can’t control the 
urge’ to molest children.”106  Furthermore, he had sought help and found 
“that despite having received professional help for his pedophilia, he 
continued to harbor sexual desires for children.”107  This led him to the
conclusion “that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing
children in the future was ‘to die.’”108  What should the state do with
someone like him?
One way to handle people like Hendricks is to say that they should be 
quarantined because their psyche is essentially like a contagious disease:
they cannot mix with the general public without exposing others to 
serious risk.109  This would be fitting if (1) they really could not avoid 
acting on their urge to molest children when they got it, and (2) they 
could not tell when the urge was coming on so as to put themselves in a
position where others could prevent them from acting on it.  If that is 
really their condition, they should not be subject to criminal prosecution
at all.110  Like Odysseus tying himself to the mast while within earshot 
of the sirens and their song,111 they should be subjected to LTPD in the
105. There is reason to doubt that their risk of recidivism is particularly great.  See 
Ahluwalia, supra note 104, at 494–95.  And there is reason to doubt that the concept of a 
mental abnormality is anything other than a label designed to say that we find these 
people scary. See Morse, supra note 4.  I am willing to grant, however, at least for the
sake of argument, that the notion of a mental abnormality, making it especially difficult
for them to control their behavior, is not a complete fiction but rather descriptively true 
of at least some SVPs. 
106. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355 (alteration in original). 
107. Id. at 354. 
108. Id. at 355. 
109. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
110. He would be acquitted under the MPC’s standard for insanity, which excuses 
conduct if the actor “lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).  He would not be acquitted under the 
M’Naghten rule, which excused criminal actions only if the defendant did not know “the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong.”  M’Naghten’s Case, [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 722.
Federal law uses an even narrower test, a version of prong one of the M’Naghten rule.
See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).  So much the worse, however, for federal law and any
jurisdiction following the M’Naghten rule.  See Corrado, supra note 104, at 105. 
111. See Morse, supra note 93, at 152. 
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form of a quarantine, at least until they can be cured to the point where 
they can see the urge coming and then commit themselves to a detention 
facility for a short period of time, until the urge has passed.
But suppose their condition is not that extreme.  Suppose they can tell 
when the urge is likely to come on and can resist it long enough to get 
themselves into a position where others can help them resist it.  In that 
case, punishment for the choice to indulge the urge would be
appropriate.  Moreover, lost immunity to LTPD would plausibly be a 
fitting part of their punishment if they do indulge it.  The fittingness of 
lost immunity draws on the same set of ideas that were relevant in 
explaining lost immunity for recidivists: one has a duty to ensure that
one does not commit crimes.112  Recidivists acquire that duty after their 
first conviction, which should alert them to the need to reform
themselves.  SVPs acquire the duty in virtue of their recognizing— 
something we can assume they can do as long as they are not insane— 
both their strong impulse to have sexual relations with children or others 
who do not or cannot give their consent and the fact that acting on this 
impulse is criminal.  The fact that SVPs suffer a mental disorder that 
“makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for [them] to control [their]
dangerous behavior’”113 may serve as a mitigating factor,114 reducing the
punitive sentence that they deserve.  But their failure to take sufficient
care to ensure that they would not act on such an impulse shows a
disregard for the law and their potential victims that could justify lost 
immunity to LTPD as part of their punishment, extending beyond the
shortened period of punitive detention.
Importantly, on the lost status view, the significance of having 
committed a crime is not so much epistemic—evidence that a person is 
likely to commit the crime again—as punitive—grounding loss of the
right to be treated as any other presumptively law-abiding, autonomous,
accountable person.  The disorder itself can clearly be present in a 
person who has not yet sexually preyed upon anyone.  We would not and
should not allow persons to be detained simply in virtue of having the 
disorder.115  One might think that the reason is that the diagnosis is not
sufficiently certain without a corroborating act.  That is the epistemic 
112. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
113. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). 
114. Compare the partial defense of extreme emotional disturbance proposed by
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962). 
115. As the Court in Hendricks pointed out, there were actually four conditions that 
would allow for LTPD of SVPs, only the first of which was conviction for a sexually
violent offense. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352.  But the other three were all variations of
the kind of mental illness that should suffice for detention under Addington.  Id.; see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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view of the act.  But the premise of that view, that one learns who really
has the disorder by seeing who is convicted of a crime of sexual
violence, is surely dubious.  The more sensible view is that it is the act 
of indulging the impulses caused by the disorder that justifies treating
the actor, for some period of time, as someone who has lost the status of 
a presumptively law-abiding person.  Until that time, the actor deserves 
to benefit from the normal presumption that he will be law-abiding and
will do what needs to be done to resist the temptation to prey sexually 
upon others.116 
V. DEFENDING THE RETRIBUTIVE BONA FIDES OF THE  
LOST STATUS VIEW
I have claimed throughout that the lost status view contributes an
important dimension to retributive punishment theory.  It expresses a
particular form of condemnation for certain crimes.  In particular, it 
expresses the thought that certain especially serious crimes or recidivist 
patterns of serious crime show such disrespect for the law and the
victims of the crime that the actor deserves to lose, for a period of time,
the benefit of the presumption that he will be law-abiding in the future. 
In this last part of the Article, I want to do two things: First, I want to 
defend the idea that this kind of punishment is really defensible as a 
retributive punishment.  This will involve responding to five objections. 
Second, I want to say a little bit about what it would mean for the 
punishment to be proportional to the crime, as retributive punishments 
must be. 
A.  Five Objections and Replies 
The first objection is that the loss of an immunity is just not how 
retributive punishment works; it works by depriving people, in
decreasing order of severity, of life, liberty, or property.117  In other
words, it works through imposition of the death penalty, imprisonment, 
or fines.  The problem with this objection is that it is naïve on two levels.
First, even if we restrict ourselves to this traditional triad of
punishments, it is clear that there is no one form of punishment that is 
116. For a similar view, see Corrado, supra note 29, at 811. 
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
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the retributive form of punishment.  Second, the traditional triad is far 
from exhausting the options that retributivists have used.  For example, 
the U.S. Constitution mentions, in passing, another traditional form of
punishment, now thought of as barbaric, namely, maiming, when it says 
that no one shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”118  This certainly fits the most ancient
retributive idea, lex talionis, calling for an eye for an eye and a tooth for 
a tooth.119  In a related vein, whipping was common in the United States 
and elsewhere in earlier centuries.120  There have also been shaming 
punishments, such as the stocks,121 and hard labor, now presented in 
more humane form as “community service,”122 and other punishments as
well.  I certainly do not mean to endorse all or even most elements in 
this wide range of punishments.  Many are needlessly cruel and
counterproductive.  But I do mean to point out that imprisonment is not 
the only option for a retributivist.123  Therefore, the burden would seem
to be on critics to show that there is some reason this particular loss of
immunity cannot complement those other punishments that are 
acceptable to retributivists. 
A second objection is that the lost status view is dehumanizing.
It might be thought dehumanizing because, in merely weighing a
detained actor’s interest in liberty against society’s interest in security, it 
treats autonomous persons like dangerous animals.124 But the lost status
view does not treat those who are sentenced to lost immunity to LTPD 
as mere animals across the board.  It does not imply that they lose any of 
their other rights central to their humanity, such as the rights of freedom 
of conscience, of religion, or of speech; the right not to be used for 
medical experiments without their consent; the right not to be used as 
slave labor; and the right to legally contest their legal status and
treatment.125  The loss of status is limited to the loss of the presumption 
118. Id. (emphasis added). 
119. See Laws of Hammurabi, in LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA 
MINOR 121, 196–97, 200 (Martha T. Roth trans., 1995). 
120. See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 733, 733 (1998); see also FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 71
(David McDuff trans., Penguin Books 1985) (1860). 
121. See Garvey, supra note 120, at 733. 
122. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 15, at 108. 
123. Indeed, prisons are a relatively recent innovation.  See generally  ADAM JAY 
HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA
(1992) (describing the evolution of prisons in the United States).
124. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
125. This list of rights can be found in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, in Article 18(1) (freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion); Article 7 (freedom from unconsented medical experimentation); 
Article 8 (freedom from slave labor); Article 14 (right to contest legal status). 
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that an actor will be law-abiding.  Indeed, because it limits an actor’s 
detention to those cases in which his interest in liberty is outweighed 
by the community’s interest in security, and because it requires the state
to use the least restrictive interventions that will meet the security 
interests of the community, it promises to be a more humane form of 
punishment than the loss of liberty itself. 
A third objection is that loss of immunity to LTPD is obviously
concerned with future actions, but retributivism must base punishment
on past actions.  This objection confuses, as Douglas Husak points out, 
the question, “[W]hat is the purpose for which punishment is inflicted?,” 
with the question, “[I]n virtue of what is punishment inflicted?”126 
Retributivism requires that punishment be imposed only in virtue of past 
criminal actions, but it does not require that punishment be imposed only
for the purpose of responding to past acts.  A moderate and plausible 
form of retributivism does not require, as Kant’s extreme form of
retributivism did require, that the punishment exactly match the crime 
with no consideration given to other purposes that might be met.127 
Rather, even as strict a retributivist as Michael Moore acknowledges that 
“[s]eparate argument is needed to answer [the] ‘how much’ and ‘what
type’ questions, after one has described why one is punishing at all.”128 
What a moderate and plausible form of retributivism is committed to is 
only three things: (1) that it is intrinsically good to punish the guilty as 
much as they deserve on the basis of a fair scheme of punishment,
(2) that it is intrinsically bad to punish the innocent mistakenly or to 
punish anyone more than that person deserves on a fair scheme of
punishment, and (3) that it is impermissible to aim to punish the 
innocent or to inflict on anyone a punishment greater than he deserves in
the fair system of punishment that was part of the legal order in effect at 
the time and place he committed his crime.129  This view leaves open the
option that a fair scheme of punishment may and should be designed, in
 126. Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1186 (2011). 
127. “[W]oe to him who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to 
discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its 
amount by the advantage it promises.”  IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
141 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).  But see infra Part V.B (arguing 
that even Kant’s theory fails to meet his high standard).
 128. MOORE, supra note 84, at 88. 
129. This is a paraphrase and slight modification of a formulation found in Ferzan, 
supra note 29 (citing ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 5, at 3–19). 
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part, to achieve the social good of preventing future crime.  Lost
immunity to LTPD is no different from punitive sentences in this regard:
both help protect innocent people from future criminal acts, and both can 
be imposed only insofar as they are a fitting and proportional
punishment for past crimes. 
A fourth objection is that the lost status view is not really concerned 
with expressing or communicating condemnation for wrongs done130 but
is instead really just about depriving people of an immunity if they do
not deserve to benefit from it.  Retributivism requires the former; the
latter is more closely related to civil commitment for the mentally ill and 
dangerous.  Moreover, this is no mere gripe about labeling. Civil
commitment for the mentally ill is justifiable only insofar as their 
capacity to operate as autonomous actors is compromised.131  Those who 
lose their status as presumptively law-abiding generally retain the
autonomous capacity.  Therefore, if their lost status cannot be justified in 
retributive terms, then it runs afoul of the Autonomy-Respecting Model.
The response to this objection is, much like the response to the last
objection, that it exaggerates what is required for a punishment to be
retributive. A punishment does not have to be solely concerned with
expressing or communicating censure for wrongs done to be retributive. 
It can also be fitting.  Being fitting in no way undermines the idea that 
the loss can convey the censure essential to retributivism.  Rather, it 
simply refines the message, adding a bit of content, so that instead of 
saying simply, “Your deed merits condemnation,” it says, “Your deed
was so heinous that you no longer retain the right to walk freely among 
us.”  The loss of immunity, then, is not just fitting in the way that civil
commitment of the mentally ill and dangerous is fitting.  It is also
responsive to the wrong the person has done and expressive of censure 
and condemnation for the choice. 
The last objection is that a convict’s being subject to LTPD after 
having served a punitive sentence can only be an exercise of pure 
preventive detention because the retributive justification for punishment
has been exhausted.  This, it can be argued, is made clear from the fact
that we normally speak of people who have served their time in prison as 
having “paid their debt” to society.
There are two problems with this objection.  First, it is not so clear, in 
practice, that we do feel that those who have served their time have paid
their debt in full in such a way as to deserve no continuing loss of rights. 
There are a range of disabilities that follow certain convicts post-sentence, 
ranging from the LTPD of SVPs, to registration requirements for certain
130. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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sex offenders, to loss of the right to use firearms, to the loss of voting 
rights of many convicted felons.  These are officially not justified as 
punitive,132 and some are morally if not constitutionally dubious.133 But 
all reflect the general belief that a convict may deserve to lose more than
just liberty for the period of the punitive sentence.  An honest treatment
of these practices would recognize them not only as predicated on a 
conviction but as part of the punishment in a larger sense.134 
132. See Megan’s Law, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/ (last 
updated 2009). A law that declares the deprivation it imposes to be civil, not criminal, 
may still be judged criminal for purposes of applying the Constitution’s restriction on ex 
post facto laws if the effect is sufficiently punitive.  The traditional test has seven factors: 
[(1)] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [(2)]
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [(3)] whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [(4)] whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [(5)] 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [(6)] whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [(7)] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned. 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (citations omitted).  The 
Court has held that these factors “are ‘neither exhaustive nor dispositive,’ but are ‘useful
guideposts.’”  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 
(1997)).  The Court has also held that “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override 
legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty.”  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (citation omitted) (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249). 
133. A large majority of focus groups based in Rutgers University—faculty and
students—“were opposed to the permanent disenfranchisement of felons.” Milton
Heumann, Brian K. Pinaire & Thomas Clark, Beyond the Sentence: Public Perceptions 
of Collateral Consequences for Felony Offenders, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 24, 34 (2005).  This 
fits an earlier finding in a national study that found that “a supermajority (81.7%) of 
Americans opposed the permanent disenfranchisement of felons.”  Id. at 27.  The typical 
concern in the focus groups was that disenfranchisement is inconsistent with reintegration into
the community, though many wanted to make distinctions between different kinds of
felonies.  Id. at 34–35.  But see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding
that denying felons who had served their time the right to vote did not violate their
constitutional right to equal protection under the law). 
134. Notwithstanding the Court’s “clearest proof rule,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100, 
I believe that most should also be recognized as punitive in the narrow sense relevant to 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 62, 70 (1st Cir. 
2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Massachusetts constitutional 
amendment disqualifying currently incarcerated felons from voting in certain elections
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause under the Mendoza-Martinez test), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 412 (2010); State v. Schmidt, 23 P.3d 462, 477 (Wash. 2001) (Johnson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “restricting an individual’s right to bear arms is a punishment 
for a felony conviction, not a regulation”); see also  BURT NEUBORNE & ARTHUR
EISENBERG, THE RIGHTS OF CANDIDATES AND VOTERS 32 (1976) (“The most
straightforward explanation of [criminal disenfranchisement] provisions . . . is that they are 
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Second, as discussed in Part IV.A, there are different purposes served
by punitive detention and loss of immunity to LTPD.  The former serves,
among other things, to deter others from committing crimes; the latter 
does not, or at least that is not so central to its function.  Additionally,
the former extends sentences when criminal acts cause harm because
those who cause harm have more to atone for, and longer sentences, with 
greater deterrent value, allow them to bear that burden.  Those who do
not cause harm, then, will have relatively short punitive sentences, which 
may leave an amount of time that would be fitting for lost immunity to
LTPD yet to run.  Similar things were said about punitive sentences for 
recidivists and for SVPs.  In all of these cases, the deserved punitive 
sentence may not cover the period of time that it seems is fitting to strip 
someone of immunity to LTPD.  Thus, it is not obviously true that 
criminals who have served a prison sentence have fully paid their debts 
to society; they may still owe more in terms of other sanctions that can
reasonably be imposed. 
B.  Proportionality in the Lost Status View 
This last objection brings us to the second issue concerning the
retributive bona fides of the lost status view: how can we set some
notion of proportional loss of immunity to LTPD?  To answer that 
question it will help to understand proportionality in a plausible way
when it comes to punitive detention.  We can then apply what seems true
there to lost immunity to LTPD. 
The position I think we must take for proportionality in punitive 
sentencing is fundamentally an ordinal, not a cardinal, notion, but one in
which the ordinal scale is anchored by reference to two different types of 
considerations: (1) symbolic considerations, and (2) utilitarian ones.  To
see why this seems right, let us start by considering why a cardinal 
approach—one that would set the magnitude of penalties to some measure 
that is absolutely appropriate for the crime committed—is implausible. 
The only model for a cardinal approach of which I am aware is Kant’s
model of ius talionis: “[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon 
another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself.  If you insult
him, you insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; 
if you strike him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill 
yourself.”135  What does it mean to “steal from yourself”?  Kant answers, 
penal in nature and that the deprivation of the franchise is yet another form of punishment
that is imposed upon persons convicted of felonies.”), quoted in Alec C. Ewald, “Civil
Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United
States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2002). 
 135. KANT, supra note 127, at 141. 
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“Whoever steals makes the property of everyone else insecure and
therefore deprives himself (by the principle of retribution) of security in 
any possible property.”136 
The problems with this model are obvious.  It is, first of all, likely to
be too harsh.  Moreover, it is radically unclear how to apply the system,
which may compound the first problem, but it also adds the problem that 
it may in some cases be too lenient.  Starting with the charge that Kant’s
model is too harsh, one way to see this is to consider more of what Kant 
says about the punishment for stealing.  As Kant himself notes, if 
persons do not have any right to property, they can survive only if others 
provide for them.  Moreover, because “the state will not provide for him 
free of charge, he must let it have his powers for any kind of work it 
pleases (in convict or prison labor) and is reduced to the status of a slave
for a certain time, or permanently if the state sees fit.”137  A lifetime of
slavery as a just punishment for theft?138 
Next, note that the length of the sentence hardly avoids Kant’s critique 
of other principles that “are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence of 
pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into 
them.”139  What could be more fluctuating than letting the state decide
whether to sentence someone to slavery for a “certain time” or
“permanently” as it “sees fit”?  At best, just and well-governed judges, 
given such a directive, would consult utilitarian principles.  But the
result would be far less bounded than any contemporary version of 
limiting retributivism.140 
Returning to the first problem, that of harshness, what are we
supposed to do with criminals who do things like torture and rape their 
victims?  Have they deprived themselves of any security against torture
and rape?  Must the state torture and rape them, or must it merely stand 
by and let others do so?  Or is the category of harm they inflicted upon 
themselves simply loss of protection from physical assault, in which 
case they must put themselves at the mercy of the state to protect them,
putting them in exactly the same position as thieves?  If the state must
either rape and torture them, or even if it must merely stand by and allow
136. Id. at 142. 
137. Id.
138. For a fan of Les Miserables, like me, it is impossible to think of this and not 
think of Jean Valjean’s protest: “All I did was steal some bread!” 
 139. KANT, supra note 127, at 141. 
140. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
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them to be raped and tortured, then the punishment according to Kant’s 
vision of ius talionis is not only too harsh but grotesque.  If instead the 
state must protect them but at the cost of enslaving them just as it would 
enslave thieves, then because Kant’s standard offers the state no guidance 
on how long it can enslave those who assault others, the punishment
might be too lenient.  And for the icing on the cake, it is not at all clear
how one could even begin to determine which is the correct way to 
conceive of what torturing rapists will for themselves—the loss of 
protection from torture and rape in particular, or assault in general. 
Because I see no alternative candidate for a cardinal account of 
retributive punishment, I turn to the idea of ordinal proportionality,
according to which more severe crimes deserve more severe punishments—
more severe punishments express greater censure, conforming to the 
judgment that the act was more blameworthy141—but there is no absolutely 
correct measure for any given crime. Interestingly, Paul Robinson and 
Robert Kurzban argue, based on empirical research, that although people
do not agree on the absolute level of punishment fitting for a particular 
crime, they do agree to a great extent “on the relative degree of 
blameworthiness among a set of cases.”142 Moreover, 
[o]nce a society determines the end point of the punishment continuum, shared
intuitions of justice will set each case on a specific point on the continuum in its
appropriate place relative to other cases.  The specific amount of punishment 
due each case is fixed, then, not because there is some magical connection
between that amount of punishment and that particular offense but rather
because that is the amount of punishment needed to distinguish that case from
cases of noticeably greater and lesser blameworthiness on the limited continuum 
of punishment.143 
This seems like a fairly plausible account of how an ordinal scheme of 
proportionality would work and be morally acceptable.  But it leaves 
open how a society should come to determine the endpoints of the
punishment continuum.144  I want to suggest that two factors—other than
the difference made by causing a harm—collectively have a role in
determining those endpoints: (1) symbolic considerations, and (2) utilitarian 
considerations.  I start with symbolic considerations.  There should be 
141. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 15, at 134 (“Disproportionate
punishments are unjust . . . because they purport to condemn the actor for his conduct 
and yet visit more or less censure on him than the degree of blameworthiness of that 
conduct would warrant.”). 
142. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1854–55 (2007). 
143. Id. at 1855. 
144. A more complete treatment of ordinal proportionality would also include the 
discussion of spacing between crimes.  See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 15, at 
140. 
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some sense that the most serious crimes are met with a serious penalty. 
Of course, what counts as a serious penalty will vary from culture to
culture. But crimes such as murder should never be met with the 
equivalent of a slap on the wrist, even if, per impossible, the utilitarian
considerations called for that.  Additionally, trivial crimes should be met 
with penalties that are effectively a slap on the wrist—enough to convey
the message of condemnation but not much more.  Thus, even if utilitarian 
considerations pushed in the direction of punishing all crime quite
severely, the bottom end of the punishment spectrum should still be held 
low. 
Turning to the utilitarian considerations, the state should seek to strike 
a balance between, on the one hand, achieving utilitarian goals such as 
deterrence, and on the other hand, respecting the utilitarian principle of 
parsimony: that hard treatment is a bad thing in itself and that the state
should therefore impose on convicts the least effective hard treatment. 
These considerations by themselves could lead to a clear inversion of 
proportionality because, for example, it might be most effective to punish
high-profile defendants more severely than low-profile ones because
their punishment would have more deterrent effect.145  Or it could be that
the only way to deter some not very serious crimes is by punishing them 
quite severely.  These sorts of utilitarian inversions of proportionality
would be ruled out by a notion of ordinal proportionality.  In addition,
the tendency to inflict harsh punishments across the board—to weigh 
parsimony parsimoniously—would be ruled out by the symbolic anchoring
idea. Taken together, however, the idea of ordinal proportionality,
anchored by an appeal to both symbolic and utilitarian considerations, 
seems to provide a fair measure for a system of proportional punishment
for any given legal regime. 
Now the question is, How could those ideas be applied in the context
of lost immunity to LTPD?  The answer is that ordinal proportionality
would apply in the same way, allowing longer periods of lost immunity
for worse crimes or greater patterns of criminal recidivism—for crimes
that demonstrate a greater disrespect for the law and the rights of the
victims.  And the anchoring ideas would be similar.  On the symbolic
side, no individuals would deserve to lose immunity to LTPD unless 
their crimes were quite serious or their patterns of criminal activity quite
long with at least some serious elements in it.  For crimes that just meet
145. See id. at 132. 
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that cutoff—and I will suppose that for first convictions aggravated
assault is at the low end for such a cutoff—the period of lost immunity
should be on the low end.  Thus I would endorse the example of the person
who commits aggravated assault but gets “lucky” and does not harm the
intended victim, and who gets sentenced to three-and-a-half years of 
punitive detention, also getting another two-and-a-half years of lost 
immunity to LTPD.146  The six years of lost immunity to LTPD is far 
from trivial, but it is also on the low end of periods that might make any 
meaningful difference to the community.  Meanwhile, at the high end,
the period of lost status should track that of punitive sentences.  If the 
latter can last for the rest of a person’s life, then so can the former; if the 
punitive sentence can last only for a term of years, then it would seem 
extreme for lost immunity to last longer.  As for utilitarian considerations,
their center of gravity in the context of lost immunity to LTPD is
obviously incapacitation.  Those would push in the direction of allowing
longer periods of lost status.  The concern with parsimony would be
handled primarily through the fact that any individual would be subjected to
only that amount of lost liberty necessary for the security of others.  But 
the upper end, and the overall distribution of sentences of lost immunity,
would still be constrained by the notion of ordinal proportionality and 
the symbolic anchors just discussed.
One final clarification is called for.  Assessments of future dangerousness 
are not a factor in determining the length of the lost status punishment. 
They are relevant only to determining whether actors who have lost their 
status as presumptively law-abiding persons should actually be detained. 
Of course, predictions of future dangerousness are likely to be based on 
past actions, and thus, there is no clean separation between the past 
actions setting the length of the lost immunity period and the question of 
dangerousness.  But the connection is not logically tight. It is only a
reflection of common elements in both considerations.  For example, 
Jones may have committed a serious crime for idiosyncratic reasons that
are unlikely to repeat.  He might then be subject to a lost status sentence
because of his highly culpable act but might not actually deserve to be 
subject to LTPD because he might be held not to be dangerous.  And 
regardless of how dangerous a person seems, if he is judged to be an 
autonomous and accountable person, then when the lost status sentence 
is up, he must be treated as one and released and again given the 
presumption of being a law-abiding person.147 
146. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
147. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80–83 (1992) (holding that states cannot 
detain people who have served their sentences simply because they are dangerous).
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VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I think it would improve both our security 
and the fairness of our criminal justice system to add the punishment of 
lost immunity to LTPD, based on lost status as a presumptively law-
abiding citizen, to the arsenal of sanctions the state has at its disposal.  It
not only would help us, as a nation, deal more effectively with serious 
threats from terrorists and the like, but it would also allow us to avoid 
the most egregiously unjust uses of LTPD, such as for recidivists who
are not committing serious crimes. 
I want to conclude with a brief discussion of two practical issues. 
First, if a state added this sanction to its arsenal, that would clearly affect
plea bargaining.  That would not, however, clearly be a bad thing.
Prosecutors would have a new punishment to bargain with, but defendants
would have a more humane alternative to bargain for.  Besides, plea
bargains operate in the “shadow” of the trial system.148  So the same  
basic concern would still arise: would a prison sentence that a person is 
bargaining for be so short that that person should still suffer a longer 
period of lost immunity to LTPD afterwards?  Some defendants may be
able to bargain away both the punitive sentence and a period of lost 
immunity to LTPD.  But that already happens with plea bargains that
include the possibility of probation rather than time in prison.  In the 
end, therefore, I do not think this would be terribly disruptive of the way
a criminal justice system that is heavily reliant on plea bargaining would 
work. 
Second, it is worth asking whether sentences of lost immunity to 
LTPD would run into ex post facto problems.  Clearly that would not be 
a problem for those whose crimes are committed after any laws
explicitly creating this sanction are passed.  But what about those whose 
crimes have already been committed?  I think the answer depends on the 
kind of sentence they are now serving.  Consider the following three 
categories of cases.  First, if someone is serving a recidivist sentence
under a three-strikes regime, a change to a lost status regime would not
inflict any new punishment on that person.  It would, instead, effectively 
commute the sentence into something more humane and just.  There can
be no ex post facto problem with that.
148. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2464–65 (2004). 
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Second, if someone is subject to civil commitment as an SVP, it is 
debatable whether there would be a problem.  On the one hand, the 
person’s treatment would go from being categorized as civil to being 
categorized as criminal.  That change would trigger the concern with ex 
post facto limits.  On the other hand, if courts are willing to look past
this categorical but superficial distinction and examine the substance of
the treatment, they may come to recognize that the detention of SVPs is 
already predicated on a prior criminal act and that shifting to the lost
status model simply expresses more clearly, and reframes more humanely, 
what was already going on. 
Third, in some cases, such as those of terrorists who give material
support to terrorist groups (serious support, such as major amounts of 
fundraising), or those who attempt crimes where the sentence without 
the harm is small and we worry that the person deserves to lose the
status of a presumptively law-abiding person for a period of time longer 
than the punitive sentence, the Ex Post Facto Clause would be a barrier 
to retroactively imposing sentences of lost immunity to LTPD.  But such 
limits are best handled by recognizing them and moving on in a lawful 
way by passing new laws and applying them only prospectively.149  If 
legislators think this would be a good tool to have in the judicial arsenal, 
then they should pass the legislation and let it work going forward. 
149. Consider, for example, the laws criminalizing material support for terrorism. 
Sections 2339A and 2339B of Title 18 of the U.S. Code “were not amended to expressly
apply extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons until October 2001 and December
2004, respectively.”  DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK 
FORCE 22 n.21 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-
review-final-report.pdf.  That limits their utility in prosecuting detainees in Guantanamo. 
So be it.  That does not justify either imposing LTPD on those who cannot justifiably be
subjected to it under the Autonomy-Respecting Model or violating the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  If such a limit applied to U.S. citizens, it would 
call for releasing and policing them as the state would do with any citizen whom it
cannot convict of a crime. 
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